Assessing the impact of the credit guarantee fund for SMEs in the field of agriculture : the case of Hungary by Dang, Thai Binh
Lengyel I. – Vas Zs. (eds) 2016: Economics and Management of Global Value Chains. 
University of Szeged, Doctoral School in Economics, Szeged, pp. 143–154. 
 
 
9. Assessing the impact of the credit guarantee fund for SMEs in the field 
of agriculture - The case of Hungary 
 
Thai Binh Dang 
 
Credit guarantee has an important role in promoting the development of small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Especially many countries including Hungary applied the credit guarantee fund 
to promote SMEs in the field of agriculture and rural. This study aims to assess the impact of credit 
guarantee foundation through the case of Rural Credit Guarantee Foundation of Hungary for SMEs 
in the agricultural sector. In this study, the author used quantitative method to evaluate the impact of 
Rural Credit Guarantee Foundation for SMEs in reducing financial cost, increasing sales, increasing 
investment etc. 
 




SMEs are an important part of the economy and the driving force for development of 
each country. However, in the process of development, SMEs face many difficulties and 
challenges, such as technology, management skills, problem of information asymmetry, 
quality workforce, competition, market, economic and financial crisis, etc. Among them one 
of the major difficulties of SMEs is accessing capital from banks and credit institutions. To 
solve this problem, the countries around the world have used different financial tools to help 
SMEs easily access finance. One of the effective financial instruments applied by more 
countries in the world is credit guarantee.  
Credit guarantee institutions have played an essential role in the financial framework of 
the European economy (Leone et al. 2012). In some European countries, credit guarantee 
works fairly well, for instance Italy, Portugal and Hungary. In Europe and in the world, the 
credit guarantee system of Hungary is one of the largest credit guarantee systems with well-
structured and long tradition. Besides, the credit guarantee system in Hungary is a model 
successfully applied in credit guarantee activities. The credit guarantee system of Hungary 
includes 3 major credit guarantee institutions: Garantiqa Creditguarantee Co. Ltd, Rural 
Credit Guarantee Foundation (AVHGA) and Venture Finance Hungary Private Limited 
Company. In particular, AVHGA was established by Ministry of Agriculture in 1991 with the 
aim of supporting farmer, SMEs in the agricultural sector easier access to finance and 
promote rural development. 
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2. Literature review 
 
According to research by Levitsky (1997) credit guarantee scheme began appearing in 
the Philippines as far back as 1952, then appeared in  Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Korea, 
etc in the 1970’s; and Chile, Columbia, India and Thailand in the 1980’s. And the first credit 
guarantee schemes were established in Europe in the 1840s (Deelen − Molenaar 2004). Until 
2003, there were 2250 credit guarantee schemes existing and operated in 100 countries in the 
world (Green 2003). In particular, many countries chose the credit guarantee as a financial 
instrument to deal with the financial crisis in 2008. 19 of the 23 OECD countries used credit 
guarantee schemes as a support for SMEs to easily access finance and overcome financial 
crisis (Uesugi et al. 2010). Thus, it can be said that credit guarantee scheme has become a 
trend and it is applied in most of the countries around the world. So what is the reason for the 
rise of credit guarantee schemes in the world?  
More researchers have shown that credit guarantee schemes were set up to help SMEs 
to resolve the difficulties in accessing finance from banks. The difficulties of SMEs in 
accessing finance from bank are due to the following reasons: (1) Lack of collateral, (2) 
Problem of information asymmetry, (3) High cost of lending to SMEs and (4) High risk in the 
process of lending to SMEs.  
Although SMEs were recognized as an important sector that helps in creating jobs and 
are the driving force of economic development, but  the process of developing SMEs face 
many obstacles, especially the limited access to finance. A research by the European 
Commission (2013) pointed out that one third of the SMEs survey did not manage to get the 
full financing they had planned for during 2013 and 15% of survey respondents saw access to 
finance as a significant problem for their companies. One of the main reasons for the access 
to finance from banks is the lack of collateral and this is a particularly important problem for 
start-ups and young SMEs. 
Most start-up and SMEs when starting to do businesses tend to use their own resources, 
from family and friends and also from the other external funding sources such as banks. 
Therefore in order to develop, expand production and business, SMEs looks to external 
sources and mainly access bank financing. On the other hand, banks before lending to SMEs 
they often follow the precautionary principle and risk prevention. One of the requirements of 
banks when making lending to SMEs is to have collateral. Effective collateral will help 
SMEs to easily borrow money from the bank by reducing the risks and losses of the banks 
when providing loan based on good collateral (OECD 2013). However SMEs are 
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characterized by small scale, lack of capital, poor technical equipment, weak management 
capabilities and marketing etc. Therefore a lot of SMEs cannot access funds from banks 
because they do not meet the conditions for collateral. Moreover, banks are often restricted in 
the types of collateral that they accept (Deelen − Molenaar 2004). Many central banks in 
many countries have the regulations for the type of collateral and they do not accept some 
kind of collateral such as stocks, receivables, etc. Especially during the financial crisis, many 
countries collateral requirement increased significantly, and it affected the ability of SMEs to 
access credit. Thus it can be said that collateral is great challenge and obstacle for SMEs in 
process of accessing finance.  
Beside the difficulty in meeting the requirements on collateral during accessing 
financing banks, SMEs still have trouble in getting loans from banks due to the problem of 
information asymmetry. Research by the European Bank Coordination Initiative (EBCI 2014) 
indicated that SMEs are more affected by credit rationing than larger companies, since the 
information asymmetry is more pronounced for SMEs. Information asymmetry is a big and 
serious problem that exists between SMEs and credit institutions. The existence of 
information asymmetry which affects the decisions of bank when lending to SMEs is due to 
the fact that the banks cannot assess creditworthiness of SMEs, as well as SMEs lack of 
relevant information, lack of financial records, credit history, etc. In addition, for SMEs 
evolving in the formal sector, the absence of accounting standards or, on the contrary, the 
excessive level of accounting information (Lifilleur 2009) also results to information 
asymmetry. The lack of information affects the decision of banks and credit institutions in the 
process of lending to SMEs. According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), asymmetric information 
can lead to adverse selection moral hazard. 
The adverse selection occurs when information relating to borrowers, such as the 
effectiveness of the project, project risk, project plans and so on which are known more by 
the borrower rather than credit institutions. Therefore, the lenders who are in the relatively 
disadvantaged position are only able to raise interest rate to reduce potential risk of credit 
losses. The research by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) pointed out that in order to protect them 
and to avoid adverse selection banks often raise the cost of bank debt or limit credit for SMEs 
when SMEs are not ready to get funds at higher price. In particular, for the SMEs with weak 
operations, increasing interest rate makes it difficult for them in accessing finance and they 
are not willing to pay higher interest rate. On the other hand, most of banks choose higher 
interest rates to avoid the risk of loans or rejecting loan demand of SMEs. Because of the 
relative weakness of SMEs compared with larger enterprises, banks often choose and prefer 
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to lend to larger enterprises. It is understandable that SMEs become the main targets to which 
“credit rationing” is administered. Many SMEs have been eliminated from market because of 
lack of access to loans. Thus, asymmetric information leads to adverse selection which makes 
it difficult for SMEs to access finance. 
Besides, information asymmetry also leads to moral hazard because the banks cannot 
monitor the entire time of the borrower, business activity of the borrower and what purpose 
the borrower uses the loan for, etc. In addition, banks can not completely know and control 
whether the borrowers are willing to repay the loan or not? Thus, moral hazard leads to bad 
debt for banks and financial institutions making loans, especially loans for SMEs difficult. In 
order to reduce risk in the lending process and get profit, banks and credit institutions have 
implemented limited credit policy for SMEs. This policy reduces lending to SMEs to avoid 
moral hazard or banks can reduce lending thresholds for SMEs and collateral requirements 
from SMEs during the lending process. SMEs also have difficulty to come up with satisfying 
mortgages to the financial institution. Therefore, financial institutions may not dare to lend 
any loans to SMEs. In conclusion, asymmetric information leads to moral hazard, which 
would further exacerbate the financing difficulties of SMEs.  
Due to the effects of information asymmetry, banks and credit institution spend more 
time and resources in monitoring SMEs than large enterprises. Banks need to supervise and 
monitor the actual situation of the borrower to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the loan 
as well as the prevention of fraud from borrowers. Therefore the bank desire to achieve much 
information about the borrowers as much as possible but the information related to the 
borrower will not be easy to achieve. In addition, information relating to borrowers is also 
very diverse such as financial statements, credit history, cash flows, business operations etc. 
In particular when borrowers are SMEs, it will be very difficult for the bank to obtain full 
information about them and also there are difficulties during routine monitoring. Most SMEs 
have weak accounting systems and non-standard, non-transparency rules, no distinction 
between company and personal assets etc. By contrast, large companies have more advantage 
in aspects such as the credit rating, valuable mortgage, etc. Also, they have relative 
transparency and accessibility of information. These advantages can effectively translate to 
total cost reduction in searching for information relating to a transaction object as well as 
supervision by banks. When the comparison of the cost, benefit and risk between large 
companies and SMEs, banks prefer lending to large enterprises, which reduces the loan to 
SMEs and aggravate the financing difficulty facing SMEs.  
 




This study focuses on assessing the impacts of Rural Credit Guarantee Foundation for 
SMEs. Based on the purpose of the research, hypotheses are formulated at the beginning of 
the research and tested in the research. It is described by the following Table 1. 
 





H0: There is no significant positive correlation between guarantee loans and sales of 
SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA 
HA: There is a significant positive correlation between guarantee loans and sales of 
SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA 
H2 
 
H0: There is no empirical evidence point out that guarantee loans can reduce 
financial cost of SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA 
HA: There is empirical evidence point out that guarantee loans can reduce financial 
cost of SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA 
H3 
 
H0: There is not a strong positive correlation between guarantee loans and 
investment of SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA  
HA: There is a strong positive correlation between guarantee loans and investment 
of SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA 
Notes: (H0 = Null Hypothesis and HA = Alternate Hypothesis) 
Source: own construction 
 
I presented the hypotheses of my research as well as the methods that were applied to 
test the hypotheses. Also, it is used to analyze the impact of Rural Credit Guarantee 
Foundation for SMEs. From identifying hypotheses and methods as well as the content of the 
impact of Rural Credit Guarantee Foundation, the author started to do deep and detailed 
research on methods. The data needed were collected and compliance with the research.  
In this research, the author use main econometric test methods will ensure better 
evaluation and its results are strong evidence, meaningful. To test the hypotheses, the author 
needs to determine what kind of methods suitable for applying. Because the data was 
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Therefore, Fixed effects model
1
 or Random effects model
2
 are appropriate methodology for 
testing. These hypotheses were tested with 0, 05 level of significance and were done by 
EVIEW. All hypotheses are tested and evaluated specific results which are presented in 
section 4. 
 
4. Research results 
 
4.1. Testing hypothesis 1. 
 
H0: There is no significant positive correlation between guarantee loans and sales of 
SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA. 
HA: There is a significant positive correlation between guarantee loans and sales of 
SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA.  
In order to determine whether there is a strong positive correlation between guarantee 
loans and sales of SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA, a Fixed effects 
model was applied using EVIEW.  
First, the author needs to check the Hausman ratio to choose which model (Fixed 
effects model or Random effects model) will be used. From the Table 2, we can observe that 
the Hausman ratio is 0.0000 < 0.05 therefore Fixed effects model was selected to test 
hypothesis. 
 
Table 2 Hausman test for hypothesis 1 
Hausman Test 
Chi-Sq. Statistic  22.560417 
Chi-Sq. d.f  1 
Prob  0.0000 
Source: own construction  
 
                                                 
1
 In statistics, a fixed effects model is a statistical model that represents the observed quantities in terms of 
explanatory variables that are treated as if the quantities were non-random
 
. In panel data analysis, the term fixed 
effects estimator (also known as the within estimator) is used to refer to an estimator for the coefficients in the 
regression model. If we assume fixed effects, we impose time independent effects for each entity that are 
possibly correlated with the regressors. 
2
 In statistics, a random effects model, also called a variance components model, is a kind of hierarchical linear 
model. It assumes that the data being analyzed is drawn from a hierarchy of different populations whose 
differences relate to that hierarchy. In econometrics, random effects models are used in the analysis of 
hierarchical or panel data when one assumes no fixed effects. The random effects model is a special case of the 
fixed effects model. 
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From the Table 3. we can observe that R-squared is 0.996506 and its corresponding P 
value is 0.0002 < 0.05. Due to P value less than 5% we reject hypothesis H0 and accept 
hypothesis HA: There is a significant positive correlation between guarantee loans and sales 
of SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA.  
 
Table 3 Test Hypothesis 1 by using Fixed effects model 
Fixed effects model 
R-squared  0.996506 
Coefficient –0.007716 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0002 
Notes: There is a significant positive correlation between guarantee loans and 
sales of SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA 
Source: own construction  
 
4.2. Testing hypothesis 2 
 
H0: There is no empirical evidence point out that guarantee loans can reduce financial 
cost of SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA.  
HA: There is empirical evidence point out that guarantee loans can reduce financial cost 
of SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA. 
In order to determine whether there is empirical evidence point out that guarantee loans 
can reduce financial cost of SMEs which received guarantee loans from credit guarantee 
institutions in Hungary, a Fixed effects model was applied using EVIEW. 
First, the author needs to check Hausman ratio to choose which model (Fixed effects 
model or Random effects model) will be used. From the Table 4. we can observe that the 
Hausman ratio is 0.0042 < 0.05 therefore Fixed effects model was selected to test hypothesis 2. 
 
Table 4 Hausman test for hypothesis 2 
Hausman Test 
Chi-Sq. Statistic  8.182772 
Chi-Sq. d.f.  1 
Prob.  0.0042 
Source: own construction  
 
From the Table 5. we can observe that R-squared is 0.926926 and its corresponding P 
value is 0.000000 < 0.05. Due to P value less than 5% we reject hypothesis H0 and accept 
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hypothesis HA: There is empirical evidence point out that guarantee loans can reduce 
financial cost of SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA.  
 
Table 5 Test hypothesis 2 by using Fixed effect model 
Fixed effect model 
R-squared 0.926926 
Coefficient 0.000693 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
Notes: There is empirical evidence point out that guarantee loans can reduce 
financial cost of SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA. 
Source: own construction  
 
4.3. Testing hypothesis 3 
 
H0: There is not a strong positive correlation between guarantee loans and investment 
of SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA. 
HA: There is a strong positive correlation between guarantee loans and investment of 
SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA. 
In order to determine whether there is a strong positive correlation between guarantee 
loans and investment of SMEs which received guarantee loans from credit guarantee 
institutions in Hungary, a Fixed effects model was applied using EVIEW.  
First, the author needs to check Hausman ratio to choose which model (Fixed effects 
model or Random effects model) will be used. From the Table 6. we can observe that the 
Hausman ratio is 0.0326 < 0.05 therefore Fixed effects model was selected to test hypothesis 3. 
 
Table 6 Hausman test for hypothesis 3 
Hausman Test 
Chi-Sq.  4.567985 
Chi-Sq. d.f  1 
Prob  0.0326 
Source: own construction  
 
From the Table 7. we can observe that R-squared is 0.940442 and its corresponding P 
value is 0.0062 < 0.05. Due to P value less than 5% we reject hypothesis H0 and accept 
hypothesis HA: There is a strong positive correlation between guarantee loans and investment 
of SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA. 
Assessing the impact of the credit guarantee fund for SMEs in the field of agriculture… 151 
 
Table 7 Test Hypothesis 3 by using Fixed effects model 
Fixed effects model 
R-squared 0.940442 
Coefficient –2.49E-07 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0062 
Notes: There is a strong positive correlation between guarantee loans and investment 
of SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA 




The main contribution of this research is to evaluating the impact of the Rural Credit 
Guarantee Foundation for SMEs in agriculture sector. Through the above analysis, this paper 
shows that AVHGA has significant impact in bringing many benefits to SMEs in agriculture 
sector such as reducing financial cost, increasing sales, and increasing investment. To achieve 
the objectives of this research, a quantitative research method was applied. By using 
quantitative research methods combined with the actual evidence, it will ensure that the result 
of this research is credible and valuable for utilization. Based on the literature review, data 
analysis and hypotheses testing, the following are the results of the finding and research: 
Thesis 1.: There is a significant positive correlation between guarantee loans and sales 
of SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA. 
Thesis 2.: There is empirical evidence point out that guarantee loans can reduce 
financial cost of SMEs which received guarantee loans from AVHGA. 
Thesis 3.: There is a strong positive correlation between guarantee loans and investment 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 Testing Hausman ratio of hypothesis 1 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
Cross-section random 22.560417 1 0.0000 
     
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
Guaranteed loans -0.007716 -0.005389 0.000000 0.0000 
     
Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: Net sales   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 03/30/16   Time: 10:09   
Sample: 2012 2014   
Periods included: 3   
Cross-sections included: 50   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 987774.9 52179.90 18.93018 0.0000 
Guaranteed loans -0.007716 0.001985 -3.886609 0.0002 
     
 Effects Specification   
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
R-squared 0.996506    Mean dependent var 792262.4 
Adjusted R-squared 0.994741    S.D. dependent var 2341623. 
S.E. of regression 169810.3    Akaike info criterion 27.18724 
Sum squared resid 2.85E+12    Schwarz criterion 28.21085 
Log likelihood -1988.043    Hannan-Quinn criter. 27.60310 
F-statistic 564.6796    Durbin-Watson stat 2.849358 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
Source: own construction  
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Appendix 2 Testing Hausman ratio for hypothesis 2 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 8.182772 1 0.0042 
     
     Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     Guranteed loans 0.000693 0.000476 0.000000 0.0042 
     
     Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: Interest paid  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 03/30/16   Time: 10:28   
Sample: 2012 2014   
Periods included: 3   
Cross-sections included: 50   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -7010.908 2525.094 -2.776494 0.0066 
Guaranteed loans 0.000693 9.61E-05 7.214740 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.926926    Mean dependent var 10552.09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.890019    S.D. dependent var 24778.79 
S.E. of regression 8217.472    Akaike info criterion 21.13040 
Sum squared resid 6.69E+09    Schwarz criterion 22.15401 
Log likelihood -1533.780    Hannan-Quinn criter. 21.54626 
F-statistic 25.11567    Durbin-Watson stat 1.784201 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
Source: own construction  
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Appendix 3 Testing Hausman ratio of hypothesis 3 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 4.567985 1 0.0326 
     
     Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     Guranteed loans -0.000000 -0.000000 0.000000 0.0326 
     
     Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: Fixed tangible asset ratio  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 03/30/16   Time: 11:16   
Sample: 2012 2014   
Periods included: 3   
Cross-sections included: 50   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 53.84628 2.338145 23.02949 0.0000 
Guranteed loans  -2.49E-07 8.90E-08 -2.796220 0.0062 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.940442    Mean dependent var 47.54334 
Adjusted R-squared 0.910362    S.D. dependent var 25.41482 
S.E. of regression 7.609080    Akaike info criterion 7.161046 
Sum squared resid 5731.912    Schwarz criterion 8.184662 
Log likelihood -486.0785    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.576909 
F-statistic 31.26498    Durbin-Watson stat 2.145162 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
Source: own construction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
